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mention a nexus or relationship requirement for a finding of state action, and apparently is consistent with the plaintiff-appellants position
in the Jaycees case, that the state must not deal with discriminators.
However, in view of the most recent line of decisions,20 the Tenth Circuit appears strongly committed to the nexus test for determining state
action.
Richard M. Eldridge

EMINENT DOMAIN-INTERFERENCE WITH ACCESS TO LAND Is NONCOMPENSABLE WHEN CAUSED BY STREET IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE
PURPOSE OF TRAFFIC REGULATION. Brewer v. City of Norman,

527 P.2d 1134 (Okia. 1974).

The plaintiff in Brewer v. City of Norman1 sought property dam-

ages in an inverse condemnation action against the city of Norman.
The basis of his cause of action was interference with access to his
property, on which he conducted a television repair business, as a result
of street improvements undertaken by the city. It was the plaintiff's
contention that in widening the street on which his property abutted
and constructing a center median, which prevented northbound traffic

from entering his property, the city had caused compensable damages
to his property.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff compensation for this impairment of access to his property, but in an eight-to-one decision, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in overruling the defendant city's demurrer and reversed the judgment. 2 In the
opinion of the supreme court, the actions of the city were an exercise
scheme connotes governmental approval of the activity; (4) the extent to which the organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the state; and (5) whether
the organization has legitimate claims to recognition as a "private" organization in associational and constitutional terms.
20. Ward v. St. Anthony's Hospital, 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973); Browns v.
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
1. 527 P.2d 1134 (Okla. 1974).
,

2. Id: at 1137.
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of the police power; and, therefore, the plaintiff had the burden of
showing that the city's actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. If the plaintiff fails to carry this burden, any action taken under
the police power of the state falls within the meaning of the maxim
damnum absque injuria.3
At first glance, this appears to be a harsh decision carrying with
it the sweeping consequence of denying any compensation to property
owners who suffer consequential damages from road construction
projects. In light of the trend to interpret broadly governmental powers
and to invoke the police power as an alternative to eminent domain
proceedings to accomplish the goals of environmentalists and other interest groups, 4 this decision conjures up the spector of the private
owner being unceremoniously brushed aside whenever the "public interest" is sought to be served.
However, placed in the proper context, Brewer does not represent
a shift in authority in Oklahoma, but it is a decision that is limited to
its own peculiar facts. In reality, it is an exception to the rule of compensability in such cases; and, curiously, an earlier case has already cre-.
ated an exception to the exception.5 Brewer should be limited to situations that are strictly analogous factually, and a review of the existing
Oklahoma authority supports that conclusion.
Article II, section 24 of the Oklahoma constitution provides in part
that "[pirivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation."6 This section of the Oklahoma constitution has long been interpreted as requiring compensation for any consequential injury sustained by a property owner,7 and there is an impressive line of authority supporting the position that Oklahoma recognizes the right of access as property."
Although the owner must show that the damages are special (that
his damages are different in kind rather than degree from those of the
public), 9 and although the courts state that "mere forced circuity of
3. Id. at 1136.
4. See Haik, Police Power Versus Condemnation, 7 NATunAI RESOURCES L. 21
(1974).
5. State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970).
6. OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (emphasis added).
7. Oklahoma City v. Vetter, 72 Okla. 196, 179 P. 473, 4 A.L.R. 1009 (1919).
8. See, e.g., Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, 316 P.2d 828 (Okla.
1957); Grand River Dam Authority v. Misenhimer, 195 Okla. 682, 161 P.2d 757
(1945); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., 180 Okla. 496, 71 P.2d
617 (1937).
9. Grand River Dam Authority v. Misenhimer, 195 Okla. 682, 686, 161 P.2d 757,
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travel" does not give rise to a right of compensation, "0 the cases have
established that whether the owner's access has been "materially impaired" is a question of fact," and that this protected right of access
is not limited to access by the owner. 2 Despite the fact that the
owner's right to compensation is created by interference with access
to his property, the measure of damages is the
reduction in market
13
value of the property caused by the loss of access.
Therefore, the weight of authority dictates compensation to the
owner of property when access to that property is impaired. On its
face, the Brewer decision is contrary to this stream of authority, and
the apparent inconsistency in the decision, in light of the factual similarity, is the major premise of the dissenting opinion.' 4 However, the
difficulty lies in the fact that the factual similarity overshadows the distinction upon which the majority chose to base its opinion.
In Brewer, the majority found that the improvements built by the
city were for the purpose of regulating traffic.' 0 The key word in this
context is "regulation." While the consequences of classifying an act
of government as one or the other is considered axiomatic in that condemnation requires compensation and an exercise of police power gives
no right to compensation, the distinction between the two is often difficult to clearly define. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,' 6 had occasion to explore the subtle

distinctions between acts of the police power and condemnation proceedings governed by the concept of eminent domain. The Court's
opinion suggests that it is necessarily a question of the particular circumstances of each case as to whether the governmental act involved
is to be classified as one pursuant to the exercise of eminent domain
or as one of police power, and that the distinction is identical to the
1'
one between a "taking" and "regulation.' 7
The failure of the majority opinion to consider the distinctions between the circumstances of Brewer and those of the earlier cases makes
it necessary to examine those cases to find the fallacy of the dissenting
761 (1945); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., 180 Okla. 496, 497,
71 P.2d 617, 618 (1937).
10. 180 Okla. at 498, 71 P.2d at 619.
11. State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways v. Aker, 507 P.2d 1227 (Okla. 1973).
12. State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970).
13. Id. at 900.
14. 527 P.2d at 1137.
15. Id. at 1136.
16. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
17. Id. at 594.
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opinion; but upon careful reflection, the distinction seems obvious. In
the principal cases cited by Justice Berry in his dissent, the governmental action was not directed to regulation of traffic on existing streets
or highways. In short, the cases cited by Justice Berry are characterized by either new highway construction 8 or construction totally unrelated to regulation of traffic. 9 Although the majority apparently felt
no compulsion to distinguish these cases from Brewer, this is surely the
distinction which explains the superficial inconsistency of their decision. In addition, this distinction explains the absence of any discussion of the police power in these early decisions.
However, one case cited by Justice Berry does involve a question
of an exercise of police power, and the decision in that case, State ex
rel. Department of Highways v. Bowles2" merits further consideration.
The basic fact pattern of Bowles invites the application of the police
power argument to deny compensation. The property involved was
the location of a drive-in restaurant abutting an existing public highway, and the interference with access complained of was created by
the closing of an intersecting street in order to create a limited-access
highway. The State Department of Highways argued that the closing
of the intersecting street was a valid exercise of the state's police power
21
and cited authority from another jurisdiction to support its position.
However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court avoided passing on this
issue which had not previously been decided in this jurisdiction, by
seizing upon an additional fact which was not present in Brewer. In
Bowles, the construction also resulted in an actual taking of a portion
of the owner's property. Therefore, the court held that since the measure of his damages for the actual taking included consequential damages equal to the decrease in value of his remaining property, it would
be arbitrary and burdensome for the courts of this state to require a
party to differentiate his consequential damages caused by the actual
taking of part of the property and those caused by his loss of access.2 2
The conclusion is obvious that to the extent that Bowles is still followed
18. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, 316 P.2d 828 (Okla. 1957) (existing highway closed by construction of new limited-access highway).
19. Grand River Dam Authority v. Misenhimer, 195 Okla. 682, 161 P.2d 757
(1945) (highway inundated by man-made lake); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., 180 Okla. 496, 71 P.2d 617 (1937) (street obstructed by raised railroad grade).
20. 472 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970).
21. Ray v. State Highway Comm'n., 196 Kan. 13, 410 P.2d 278 (1966); Brock v.
State Highway Comm'n., 195 Kan. 361, 404 P.2d 934 (1965).
22. 472 P.2d at 900-01.
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